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The tort system is roundly indicted for
its inadequacies in providing compensation in response to injury. More
egregious is its response to injuries
incurred due to negligence in the provision of healthcare services specifically.
Despite numerous calls for reform,
tort-based compensation has persisted
as the norm to date. However, recent
developments regarding physician
malpractice lead to consideration of
the possibility of a move to “no-fault”
compensation for healthcare-related
injuries. In this paper, I explore these
developments, examine programs in
various foreign jurisdictions which
have adopted no-fault compensation for
medical injury, and discuss the wisdom
and feasibility of adopting an administratively-based compensation system
for healthcare-related injury in Canada.
A number of jurisdictions around
the world have created administrative
bodies whose role is to assess and
allocate appropriate compensation in
response to healthcare-related injuries.
The primary motivation has been either
to accomplish greater justice or to deal
with burgeoning costs of the medical
malpractice system (often accompanied by threatened collapse of the major
insurer). The administrative scheme
adopted may replace tort completely
vis-a-vis claims within its purview, or it
may permit the claimant to select either
to pursue the administrative route or
to launch a civil lawsuit. The scheme
may be comprehensive, i.e., attempting
to cover all healthcare-related injury,

Le système de responsabilité civile
délictuelle est généralement blâmé pour
ses faiblesses à d’indemniser en cas de lésions. La plus remarquable est sa réponse
aux lésions découlant de la négligence
dans la prestation de services de santé
en particulier. Malgré de nombreuses
demandes de réforme, l’indemnisation
fondée sur la responsabilité civile délictuelle a continué d’être la norme à ce jour.
Cependant, de récents développements
concernant les fautes professionnelles
des médecins ont mené à étudier la
possibilité de passer à une indemnisation
sans égard à la faute pour les lésions liées
aux soins de santé. Dans notre article,
nous explorons ces développements, nous
examinons les programmes de diverses
compétences étrangères qui ont adopté
une approche d’indemnisation sans égard
à la faute pour les lésions liées aux soins
médicaux, et nous discutons du bien-fondé et de la faisabilité d’adopter un régime
d’indemnisation administratif sans égard
à la faute pour les lésions liées aux soins
médicaux au Canada.
Un certain nombre de ressorts
ont, de par le monde, mis sur pied des
organismes administratifs dont le rôde
est d’évaluer et de déterminer l’indemnisation appropriée en cas de lésions
attribuables aux soins médicaux. La motivation première pour la création de tels
organismes était soit d’obtenir une plus
grande justice, soit de juguler les coûts
croissants du système d’indemnisation
des fautes professionnelles médicales qui,
souvent, menaçaient de faillite les principaux assureurs. Le modèle administratif
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or may be limited to a particular type
or extent of injury. For example, three
jurisdictions have adopted programs exclusively focused on serious neurological
injury surrounding birth trauma.
Under these administrative schemes,
an injured claimant must establish that
the claimant fits within the program
criteria, and therefore is entitled to compensation. The claimant is aided in the
process by program administrative staff,
and often by the complainant’s health
care provider. Thus, the adversarial relationship between plaintiff and defendant
is replaced by a system wherein the care
provider may provide assistance to the
injured person in seeking compensation.
Numerous prominent individuals
have argued in favour of reform of the
Canadian tort-based medical malpractice, but governments have not been
highly motivated to take action. However, the Canadian Medical Protective
Association has recently sharply hiked
the premiums paid for the defence of
physicians and residents, in some cases
an increase of close to 100 percent from
2014–15 to 2015–16. The lion’s share of
these premiums is funded by provincial governments, whose budgets are
straining as a result. The question to be
addressed in this paper is: Are events
now such that governments will indeed
be motivated to take on reform, perhaps radical reform? These recent price
increases, combined with an enhanced
focus on patient safety, may provide the
stimulus for revision of our system’s
response to healthcare-related injury.

adopté pourrait remplacer complètement
la responsabilité civile délictuelle pour
les cas relevant de sa compétence, ou
il pourrait permettre au demandeur de
choisir la voie administrative ou d’intenter une poursuite au civil. Le modèle
pourrait être exhaustif, c.-à-d. tenter de
couvrir tous les cas de lésions découlant
de soins médicaux, ou se limiter à un type
particulier ou à une étendue de lésions.
Par exemple, trois ressorts ont adapté des
programmes portant exclusivement sur
les lésions neurologiques graves découlant de traumatismes de naissance.
Selon ces modèles, la partie demanderesse lésée doit établir qu’elle répond aux
critères du programme et a donc droit à
une indemnisation. Le personnel administratif du programme vient en aide au
demandeur/demanderesse dans le cadre
du processus et, fréquemment, le dispensateur de soins de santé en fait autant.
Ainsi, les rapports fondés sur la contradiction entre le plaignant et le défendeur sont
remplacés par un système dans lequel le
dispensateur de soins peut aider la personne lésée à obtenir une indemnisation.
De nombreuses personnalités ont
plaidé en faveur d’une réforme du
système canadien d’indemnisation des
fautes professionnelles médicales fondé
sur la responsabilité délictuelle, mais les
gouvernements n’ont jusqu’à maintenant
pas été très motivés à agir. Cependant,
l’Association canadienne de protection
médicale a récemment augmenté de façon considérable les primes à payer pour
défendre les médecins et les résidents ;
dans certains cas, l’augmentation atteint
presque 100 p. 100 entre 2014–2015 et
2015–2016. La part du lion de ces primes
est financée par les gouvernements
provinciaux dont les budgets écopent
de façon conséquente. La question à
débattre dans cette présentation est la
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suivante : Les choses en sont-elles rendues à un point où les gouvernements
seront motivés à entreprendre une
réforme, peut-être même une réforme
radicale ? Ces récentes augmentations de
coûts venant s’ajouter à l’importance accrue accordée à la sécurité des patients
pourraient bien être l’incitation voulue
pour une révision de notre système de
réponse aux lésions découlant de fautes
médicales professionnelles.
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Is It Time to Adopt a No-Fault Scheme to
Compensate Injured Patients?
Elaine Gibson*

I. INTRODUCTION
The Canadian fault-based system of redress in law for injury due to
medical malpractice functions poorly. An exceedingly small percentage
of aggrieved patients ever commence legal action, and far fewer receive
compensation as a result. A number of jurisdictions outside Canada have
rejected a fault-based response to medical malpractice and instead have
adopted a “no-fault” scheme to respond to medical mishaps. In this paper
I explore some of the reasons for the low-functioning Canadian system,
and examine whether or not a no-fault scheme of compensation for medical injury might perform in superior fashion.
A legal action commenced due to injury incurred while in receipt of
healthcare services or treatment is commonly referred to as a medical
malpractice lawsuit. This suit in civil negligence is brought by the plaintiff,
who must establish that he or she was injured due to an action or failure to
act on the part of the healthcare provider. The core of this action is proof
on a balance of probabilities that the healthcare provider failed to meet
the standard of care required in the circumstances, and that this failure
caused injury to the plaintiff. Thus, we speak of the system being “faultbased” in that the plaintiff must establish that the injury resulted from
the healthcare provider being “at fault,” that is, having been negligent in
falling below the requisite standard of care.
*

Associate Professor of Law and member of the Health Law Institute at Dalhousie University.
I am grateful to Leah Hutt and Liam O’Reilly for their assistance in the preparation of this
article, and to the Canadian Institutes of Health Research Health Law, Ethics and Policy
Training Program for its sponsorship of the conference at which this paper was presented.
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This paper commences with a discussion of the legal response to medical malpractice in Canada. I explore the low rates of compensation and
reasons therefor. The prominent role of the Canadian Medical Protective
Association (CMPA) is highlighted, and calls for reform are discussed. The
need for reform is often said to be rooted in our fault-based system, and
therefore some have argued that a no-fault system may be preferable.
I then turn to an examination of the no-fault compensation schemes
that have been adopted in ten jurisdictions around the world (Denmark,
Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, New Zealand, Virginia, Florida, Japan,
and France). These schemes can be comprehensive — i.e., intended to replace the fault-based system entirely — or restricted to a particular type or
severity of injury — e.g., solely covering obstetrically-induced brain injury.
In particular, I examine their administrative structure, the threshold criteria to qualify for compensation, whether or not there remains an option
to bring a lawsuit for negligence, what damages are available under the
administrative scheme, and how the various schemes are subsidized.
Next, I undertake a comparison between Canada’s fault-based response to medical malpractice and no-fault jurisdictions, examining the
performance of these two major types of systems on the criteria of compensation, deterrence, corrective justice, and distributive justice. Primary
aims of our fault-based tort system include compensation and deterrence.
Aristotle first discussed the normative goals of corrective and distributive justice. A range of aims — retribution by the aggrieved party against
the tortfeasor, appeasement, and atonement — may be grouped under the
Aristotelian concept of corrective justice. And the concept of distributive justice, I propose, is at the heart of any broadly-based administrative
scheme such as no-fault.
No-fault and fault-based systems of response to medical malpractice
each have strengths and weaknesses on the basis of these criteria. The application of a distributive justice lens casts a fresh light on no-fault. Ultimately, I conclude that three factors — the recent acute increase in CMPA
fees, the fact that provincial governments (and therefore taxpayers) heavily subsidize these fees, and the focus of the patient safety movement on
enhancing openness in revealing error — combine to make this an appropriate time to consider adopting a no-fault medical malpractice system in
Canada.

Is It Time to Adopt a No-Fault Scheme to Compensate Injured Patients

II. LEGAL RESPONSE TO MEDICAL MALPRACTICE IN CANADA
The major Canadian system of response in law to medical malpractice is
a civil negligence action.1 Key elements that must be established are that
a duty of care was owed on the part of the health care provider, that there
was a failure in meeting the requisite standard of care which caused injury
to the patient, and that the injury was not too remote from the negligent
action. In this section I calculate the rates of receipt of compensation for
medical mishaps in Canada based on the available evidence, and determine that the rates are low. Next, I examine potential reasons for the low
rates. The role of the CMPA is discussed, followed by numerous calls for
reform of the Canadian system of response to medical malpractice.
A. Compensation Rates
The rate of medical malpractice compensation in response to medically induced injury is exceedingly low. Civil justice statistics are not routinely available in Canada, but various estimates have been made. In 1990,
Robert Prichard indicated that less than ten percent of viable negligence
claims resulted in compensation.2 Gerald Robertson has speculated that
perhaps only two percent of injured patients are compensated.3 An examination of the statistics available in the areas of medically induced injury
and medical malpractice claim rates may prove beneficial.
The Canadian Adverse Events Study was the first and only major study
of iatrogenic injury in Canada.4 Its authors reported that Canadian acute
care hospitals in the year 2000 had an incidence rate of 7.5 adverse events
per 100 admissions. They estimated that 70,000 adverse events, defined as
“unintended injuries or complications resulting in death, disability or prolonged hospital stay that arise from health care management,”5 were “pot1

Note that the patient can also launch a disciplinary complaint with the provincial college
of the health care provider.
2 J Robert S Prichard, Liability and Compensation in Health Care: A Report to the Conference of
Deputy Ministers of Health of the Federal/Provincial/Territorial Review on Liability and Compensation Issues in Health Care (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990) at 5.
3 Gerald B Robertson, “A View of the Future: Emerging Developments in Health Care Liability” (2008) Visions Special Ed Health LJ 1 at 9.
4 G Ross Baker et al, “The Canadian Adverse Events Study: The Incidence of Adverse Events
Among Hospital Patients in Canada” (2004) 170:11 CMAJ 1678. An iatrogenic injury is one
“induced inadvertently by a physician or surgeon or by medical treatment or diagnostic procedures”: see Merriam Webster, sub verbo “iatrogenic”, online: <www.merriam-webster.com>.
5 Ibid.
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entially preventable,”6 and that 36.9 percent of those — i.e., 25,830 — were
rated as “highly preventable.”7
Next, consider the statistics as to legal actions. The CMPA, which represents the lion’s share of physicians in Canada against lawsuits, publishes
an annual report. In 2014, 866 legal actions were commenced against physicians.8 1,092 legal actions were resolved in 2014; of these, 394 resulted in
a settlement, 587 were dismissed, discontinued, or abandoned, and a meagre 111 were heard. Of the hearings in 2014,9 the plaintiff was successful in
26 cases and the defendant physician in 85 (yielding a success rate of 30
percent).
Thus, very few legal actions are commenced, and a majority of plaintiffs who do commence claims are unsuccessful at receiving any compensation (whether through settlement or judgment). And the rate of claims
commenced is in decline. The 2014 rate was the second-lowest in a number of years, and far below the peak in 1995 of 1,415 legal actions.10
It is interesting to compare these statistics to the 2004 Canadian Adverse Events Study, outlined above. Not all preventable adverse events
would result in a successful negligence claim, so I utilize the conservative
calculation base of solely ‘highly preventable’ adverse events. Linking the
25,830 highly preventable adverse events with the 866 legal actions commenced yields a rate of 3.35 percent. In other words, only approximately
3.35 percent of highly preventable adverse events appear to result in the
6 The potentially preventable adverse events are a sub-set of adverse events; for example, an
unanticipatable allergic reaction to a medication constitutes an adverse event, but is not
potentially preventable.
7 The Canadian Institute for Health Information estimated in 2004 that preventable adverse events are one of the leading causes of death in Canada (resulting in more deaths
than from breast cancer, motor vehicle injuries, and HIV combined). Canadian Institute
for Health Information, “Health Care in Canada” (2004) at 42–43, online: <https://secure.
cihi.ca/free_products/hcic2004_e.pdf>.
8 Canadian Medical Protective Association, “2014 Annual Report” (2014) at 8, online:
<https://www.cmpa-acpm.ca/documents/10179/301941554/15_AR_full_edition-e.pdf>
[CMPA, “2014 Annual Report”].
9 Presumably these figures include both trial and appellate court cases.
10 The rate of cases commenced per thousand physicians in 2000 was 22.2; in 2014 it was
9.5, a drop of approximately 60 percent. In 2000, the CMPA had 60,099 members. That
year, there were 1337 cases commenced against CMPA members, which amounts to approximately 22.2 commenced cases per 1000 members. (1337/60099) × 1000 = 22.247. In
2014, the CMPA had 91,569 members and there were 866 cases commenced against CMPA
members. That amounts to approximately 9.5 commenced cases per 1000 CMPA members.
(866/91569) × 1000 = 9.457. See Canadian Medical Protective Association, “2000 Annual Report” (2000) at 8 [on file with author] and CMPA, “2014 Annual Report”, supra note 8 at 30.
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commencement of a legal action. Further, as outlined above, most of the
small number of actions actually commenced are unsuccessful.11
The contrast between the incidence of highly preventable adverse
events and successful legal claims is startling and indeed problematic.
Why are the numbers so low?
Briefly, there are a number of salient reasons.12 First, physicians are
held to a less rigorous standard of care in negligence law than perhaps any
other person: if they can establish that they conformed to standard medical practice, unless the area is fraught with obvious risk, it is not possible
to find that their practice was negligent.13 Second, causation in medical
malpractice is extremely difficult to establish due to the complexities of
the human body, the uncertainty inherent in medical practice, and the
co-morbidities that are frequently present when one is receiving medical
treatment or service. This means it is essential that the plaintiff engage
medical expertise to bring evidence of causation — the expenses involved
are considerable. Claims on the smaller side are not worth pursuing.
Third, major resources are exhausted in sorting out potential liability as
between the physician and health care facility, as the facility is not responsible for liability on the part of physicians with visiting privileges.14 Fourth,
an unsuccessful plaintiff may be ordered to pay up to two-thirds of the
defendant’s costs. Flood and Thomas point out that this makes it risky to
go head-to-head with a well-financed opponent.15 The fifth reason is the
unique role and function of the CMPA.

11

12

13
14
15

It is important to realize that the Canadian Adverse Events Study was limited to hospital-based injuries, whereas the CMPA statistics include legal actions for incidents that
occurred outside hospitals; the percentage of claims brought would be substantially lower
if non-hospital-based injuries were included as well. Note also that these calculations assume that the 2004 statistics are representative of the contemporary incidence of adverse
events; more recent statistics are not available.
Note that this list is not intended to be exhaustive. For example, the incidence of mortality
is high for patients undergoing medical procedures, and a wrongful death claim is often
not worth pursuing due to the lower damages that result.
Ter Neuzen v Korn, [1995] 3 SCR 674 at para 51, 127 DLR (4th) 577.
Yepremian v Scarborough General Hospital (1980), 28 OR (2d) 494, 110 DLR (3d) 513.
Colleen M Flood & Bryan Thomas, “Canadian Medical Malpractice Law in 2011: Missing
the Mark on Patient Safety” (2011) 86:3 Chicago-Kent L Rev 1053 at 1068.
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B. Role of the Canadian Medical Protective Association
Approximately 95 percent of Canadian physicians purchase protection
against medical malpractice lawsuits through the CMPA.16 From its inception in 1901, the CMPA has aimed to provide vigorous defence with the
aim of preserving the reputations of its physician members.17 In 1911, the
CMPA’s founder Dr. R.H.W. Powell stated: “We have struck terror into
the evil minded who have sought to besmirch and even blackmail members of our noble profession.”18
In its 1919 Annual Report, Dr. Powell expounded on the notion of the
need for aggressive defence of the good reputations of physicians utilizing
warfare tactics:
Our organization does not consist in the fights we have put up or in the
open success we have had but rather in the silent influence we have swayed
against litigants who for a money gain have sought to blast the reputation
of conscientious, painstaking and reputable practitioners knowing or suspecting that they have an easy mark and that to avoid publicity a medical
man will often submit to what amounts to blackmail. . . . These litigants
have found out that our Counsel stands ready to accept service of the writ
and your Executive stands ready with a bank account to furnish the sinews of
war. . . . Dozens and dozens of cases have thus been strangled at their inception and have disappeared like dew off the grass.19

The stated mission of the CMPA is “to protect the professional integrity of physicians and to contribute to a high quality health care system by
promoting safer medical care in Canada.”20 It describes itself as a “valued
world-class provider of medical liability protection, a champion of medico-legal risk reduction and recognized as an important contributor to the
Canadian health care system.”21 A report published by the Secretary-Gen16 Tracey Peever, “Defend the Doctor, Protect the Patient”, Advantage Magazine (15 December
2015), online: <advantagemagazine.ca>.
17 The CMPA was incorporated by Act of the Federal Parliament in 1913. Interview of Dr.
John Gray, Executive Director/CEO of the CMPA by McGill Journal of Law and Health (22
October 2011), online: <mjlh.mcgill.ca>.
18 WDS Thomas, A Physician’s Foresight, A Profession’s Pride: A History of the Canadian Medical
Protective Association 1901–2001 (Ottawa: CMPA, 2001) at 8.
19 Ibid [emphasis added].
20 Canadian Medical Protective Association, CMPA Strategic Plan 2011–2015 (Canada: 2011) at
3, online: <https://www.cmpa-acpm.ca/documents/10179/24871/com_strategic_plan_2011-e.
pdf>.
21 Ibid.
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eral of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) in 2006 praised the CMPA model for its sound financial and actuarial risk management and described it as “quasi-unique” in its successful
operation over decades.22
Just what the CMPA actually succeeds at doing must be carefully considered. The CMPA explicitly functions not as an insurance company, but
as a “mutual defence organization.”23 This skews the likelihood of settlement and the legal concept that plaintiffs and defendants are ‘equal’ in the
eyes of the law. Plaintiffs are disadvantaged by what has been described by
Justice Moore as the “scorched earth policy” of legal counsel in defending
a medical malpractice action in Ontario.24
An Ontario judge recently admonished the physician defendant for apparent delay tactics in the case of an infant plaintiff whose thumb was
operated on instead of her baby finger:
In a case where the contemporaneous surgical note candidly and succinctly recognizes that the intended surgery was not performed, to deny liability for four years and then force the plaintiff to incur the costs of preparing
for and conducting aborted discoveries and then to incur the costs of this
motion would suggest an intentional strategy of delay. Plaintiffs don’t
have the war chest and endurance of professional defendants.25

The ability of physician defendants to hire top medical experts has
been criticized by plaintiff medical malpractice lawyer John McKiggan as
skewing the balance as between plaintiff and defendant:
In 2009, the CMPA spent $12 million dollars to hire medical experts to
defend doctors in malpractice claims. This is one area where the CMPA
has a tremendous advantage. They have a “stable” of experienced medical
experts they can call upon to defend doctors accused of malpractice. Most

22 Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development, Medical Malpractice: Prevention Insurance and Coverage Options, Policy Issues in Insurance, No. 11 (OECD Publishing,
2006) at 40–41.
23 Interview of Dr. John Gray, supra note 17.
24 Frazer v Haukioja, 62 CCLT (3d) 280 at para 2, [2008] OJ No 5306 (QL) (Ont Sup Ct). Presumably Justice Moore was echoing Paul Harte’s reference to scorched earth tactics on the
part of the CMPA, as quoted in Michael Ganley, “Hard-Nosed Medical Protective Association Has a Winning Record”, The Lawyers Weekly (13 June 2003), online: <medlit.info>.
25 Ornstein (Litigation Guardian of) v Starr, 2011 ONSC 4220 at para 76, 108 OR (3d) 380.
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patients cannot afford to have several experts look at their cases in order
to find the one that will give them the “best” answer.26

Finally, the CMPA covers all awards and settlements in negligence, no
matter how high the amount. This results in physicians not paying out-ofpocket when there is a finding of negligence or settlement in favour of the
plaintiff. This in turn reduces the incentive on the part of the physician to
settle the case.
C. Calls for Reform
There have been calls for reform of the legal response to medical malpractice in Canada from a range of sources over the years. In 1980, Justice
Linden presided over a case in which the plaintiff had been profoundly injured due to an adverse reaction to a drug. However, as the treating physicians had not been at fault, no compensation could be ordered. Justice
Linden wrote:
The law, as it now stands, can furnish no compensation to the plaintiff in
these circumstances and on this evidence. Perhaps, when it learns about
the result of this litigation, the legislature will see fit to consider looking
into this question of compensation for people who suffer rare allergic reactions to drugs through the fault of nobody. If this litigation stimulates such
a governmental study, then it will not have been in vain for the plaintiff
and for others like him who may suffer similar reactions to this and other
drugs in the years ahead.27

Robert Prichard prepared a ground-breaking report with recommendations for the Conference of Deputy Ministers of Health of the Federal/Provincial/Territorial Review on Liability and Compensation Issues in Health
Care in 1990. He reflected on rapid increases in CMPA costs, and estimated
that over $200 million was being spent annually on liability insurance for
physicians and health care institutions.28 He also found that over 50 percent of the dollars spent on medical malpractice went toward funding the
litigation and not to the injured patients,29 and that plaintiffs receive com26 Susan McIver & Robin Wyndham, After the Error: Speaking Out About Patient Safety to Save
Lives (Toronto: ECW Press, 2013) at 236.
27 Davidson v Connaught Laboratories (1980), [1981] 14 CCLT 251 at 281, [1980] OJ No 153 (QL)
(Ont Sup Ct) [emphasis added].
28 Prichard, supra note 2 at 3.
29 Ibid at 4.
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pensation in less than 10 percent of potentially viable claims.30 Ultimately
he concluded that the tort system should be retained in order to promote
deterrence, but that a no-fault scheme should be created to compensate
those who suffer serious avoidable injuries (i.e., permanent partial disability or loss of capacity for eight weeks or more); plaintiffs would have the
option of claiming in tort or under the administrative scheme.31
The CMPA did not concur in Robert Prichard’s suggestion to create a
broad no-fault system. Following an examination of alternative approaches to medical injury in 2005, it concluded that the Canadian liability model is “fundamentally sound and is very likely the best possible model for
our circumstances.”32 It did, however, endorse further research into the
possible creation of a no-fault system for patients suffering birth-related
neurological injury.33 It also recommended that the reporting of adverse
events be mandated and analyzed in the interest of patient safety, but that
there be a firewall between this information and the tort system.34
In 1996, Ontario Health Minister Jim Wilson threatened to refuse to
contribute toward physicians’ CMPA fees.35 In response, the CMPA commissioned a review of its operations to be conducted by Justice Dubin.36
He suggested in his report that there be further study of “the incremental
introduction of an administrative medical injury compensation scheme”37
and referred specifically to the Virginia neurological birth injury scheme,
but did not endorse the concept of no-fault generally.

30 Ibid at 5.
31 Ibid at 6–7. In a talk given eight years later on why there had not been significant adoption of his recommendations, Prichard reflected: “It was too ambitious to think we could
change the whole system in a federal country in one step. It is a province-by-province
challenge and I think the recommendations did not take into account the political anatomy of the era. I think what we need to do is develop experiments.” G Ross Baker & Peter
Norton, Patient Safety and Healthcare Error in the Canadian Healthcare System: A Systematic
Review and Analysis of Leading Practices in Canada with Reference to Key Initiatives Elsewhere
(Canada: 2006) at 135, online: Health Canada <www.hc-sc.gc.ca/hcs-sss/alt_formats/hpbdgps/pdf/pubs/2001-patient-securit-rev-exam/2001-patient-securit-rev-exam-eng.pdf>.
32 Canadian Medical Protective Association, Medical Liability Practices in Canada: Towards the
Right Balance: A Report (Canada: 2005) at 22, online: <books.scholarsportal.info>.
33 Ibid at 20.
34 Ibid at 19.
35 Sarah Beer, “But Will it Benefit Patients? Malpractice Insurance and the Dubin Report”
(1997) 43 Can Family Physician at 577.
36 Charles L Dubin, An Independent Review of the Canadian Medical Protective Association (Ottawa: Canadian Medical Protective Association, 1996).
37 Ibid at 146.
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The CMPA has accumulated substantial reserves: in 1997 reserves totalled $1.1 billion38 and as of 2014 they constituted $3.2 billion.39 The $1.1 billion, adjusted for inflation, would amount to just over $1.5 billion in 2014
dollars. This means that, in 2014 dollars, the reserves have more than
doubled in 17 years. Interestingly, governments across Canada have been
heavily subsidizing physician CMPA fees, such that many provinces cover
90 percent of physicians’ defence insurance fees, and Saskatchewan covers
100 percent. This approach developed as a result of fee negotiations, and
reflects the fact that physicians are prevented from direct-billing patients if
their insurance rates increase.40 All provinces outside of Ontario and Quebec have seen a dramatic increase of approximately 95 percent year-overyear from 2014–15 to 2015–16.41 In Nova Scotia, for instance, up to 2014–15,
the government was providing reimbursement to physicians totalling 90
percent of CMPA premium fees in excess of $1,500 and 100 percent of
resident physician premium fees. CMPA fees for Nova Scotia physicians
totalled $7,610,100 in 2014–15, and jumped to $15,076,300 in 2015–16, constituting a dramatic 98.1 percent increase from the previous year.42
Justice Krever conducted a Royal Commission of Inquiry on the Blood
System in Canada. In his 1997 Report, he recommended a no-fault administrative scheme “for compensating persons who suffer serious, adverse
consequences as a result of the administration of blood components or
blood products.”43 Subsequently, he has argued that Canada needs a comprehensive no-fault system responding to medical injuries.44 The Health
Council of Canada has called for an examination of no-fault compensation

38
39
40
41

Ibid at 118.
CMPA, “2014 Annual Report”, supra note 8 at 17.
Canada Health Act, RSC 1985, c C-6, s 18.
Ontario is incurring an 18% increase over the same period, and Quebec’s rates are not
changing. See CMAJ, “Legal Fees Nearly Double for Many MDs” (2014) 186:14 CMAJ 1051
at 1051, online: <www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4188644/pdf/1861051.pdf>.
42 Information on file with author. Note that the CMPA recently announced an adjustment in
fee structures commencing in 2016, with British Columbia and Alberta in a newly-created
separate region from Saskatchewan, Manitoba, the Atlantic region, and the territories. See
CMAJ, “CMPA Fees Will Go Up — and Down” (2015) 187:14 CMAJ 1039 at 1039, online:
<www.cmaj.ca/content/early/2015/09/08/cmaj.109-5149.full.pdf>.
43 Canada, Library of Parliament, Canada’s Blood Supply Ten Years After the Krever Commission,
by Sonya Norris (Ottawa: Library of Parliament, 10 July 2008) at 7, online: <www.lop.parl.
gc.ca/content/lop/researchpublications/prb0814-e.pdf>.
44 Owen Dyer, “Canada’s Legal System Cheats Patients and Doctors Alike” (2005) 2:19 National Rev Medicine <www.nationalreviewofmedicine.com>.
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for medical injuries,45 as has the Canadian Patient Safety Institute.46 In
2015, the Center for Patient Protection called for the elimination of taxpayer subsidization of CMPA liability defence fees.47
Canada is not unique in experiencing concerns with the medical malpractice system. There has been an increasing tendency to treat medical
malpractice as a unique aspect of tort law by introducing reforms specifically aimed at addressing problems in this area.48 In a 1996 review of
the overall civil justice system in the U.K., Lord Woolf indicated he was
singling out medical malpractice for the most intense scrutiny, because
during the course of his examination “it became increasingly obvious
that it was in the area of medical negligence that the civil justice system
was failing most conspicuously to meet the needs of litigants.”49 Some of
the reforms internationally have been tort-based, such as placing caps on
non-economic loss. In addition, a number of jurisdictions have adopted no-fault medical injury administrative schemes. In the next section I
explore these schemes, first discussing the comprehensive and then the
non-comprehensive no-fault models.
III. NO-FAULT COMPENSATION SCHEMES
Ten jurisdictions around the world have adopted a no-fault compensation scheme, sometimes referred to as a “health court,”50 for patient injury.51 This includes all the Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, Iceland,
45 Health Council of Canada, Press Release, “Canadians Need Quality — Not Just Quicker — 
Health Care, Health Council of Canada Says in Second Annual Report” (7 February 2006),
online: Health Council of Canada <www.healthcouncilcanada.ca>.
46 Joan M Gilmour, “Patient Safety, Medical Error and Tort Law: An International Comparison”, Commissioned Reports and Studies (Toronto: Health Canada, 2006) Paper 42 at 36,
online: <digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca>.
47 “Eliminate Taxpayer Subsidy of Doctor’s Insurance”, The Center for Patient Protection, online: <www.patientprotection.healthcare>.
48 CP McGrath, “Medical Malpractice and Compensation in Global Perspective: Vienna 3–4
December 2010” (2011) 27:1 Professional Negligence 4 at 12.
49 Lord Woolf, Access to Justice: Final Report: Final Report to the Lord Chancellor on the Civil
Justice System in England and Wales (UK: Ministry of Justice, 1996) at ch 15, online: <webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk>.
50 Michelle M Mello, Allen Kachalia & David M Studdert, “Administrative Compensation for
Medical Injuries: Lessons From Three Foreign Systems”, online: (2011) Pub 1517 Vol 14
The Commonwealth Fund at page 2 <www.commonwealthfund.org/~/media/files/publications/issue-brief/2011/jul/1517_mello_admin_compensation_med_injuries.pdf>.
51 The German Democratic Republic also had a no-fault medical injury compensation scheme,
but the reunification of Germany resulted in its demise. See Mark S Stauch, “Medical Mal-
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Norway, and Sweden), New Zealand, Virginia, Florida, Japan, and France.
These jurisdictions have done so based on one of two primary motivations: either to enhance patient experience and outcomes following iatrogenic injury, or to deal with burgeoning insurance costs.
In either case, at its core, an administrative scheme is established that is
intended to replace or supplement a tort-based system of compensation for
injury incurred as a result of a medical mishap. The key ingredients in the
schemes to be discussed are twofold: first, the absence of need to establish
the negligence of a defendant in causing the injury in order to qualify for
compensation; and second, the creation of an administrative body designed
to handle claims.52 The scheme may be comprehensive in nature or may be
restricted to a certain type or extent of injury. The threshold to qualify for
compensation is invariably more inclusive than the tort-based approach.
In this section I discuss the structures established in the various jurisdictions to administer the no-fault programs, followed by an exploration
of the threshold criteria a patient must meet in order to qualify for compensation. Whether or not one has the option to bring a negligence action
and what damages one may receive if successful are discussed. Finally, I
briefly outline how the no-fault programs are funded.
A. Administrative Structure
A claim is commenced when the injured patient submits an application
to an administrative body, which may be a Crown corporation53 or, in the
case of Virginia, the Workers’ Compensation Commission.54 In Sweden,
practice and Compensation in Germany” (2012) 86:3 Chicago-Kent L Rev 1139 at 1166. In
2015, the South African Medical Association called on its government to bring in a no-fault
compensation scheme for victims of medical mistake who do not meet the tort standard
for compensation. See Government Employees Medical Scheme, News Release, “No Fault
Insurance Proposed in the Face of Rising Claims” (20 March 2015), online: GEMS News
<www.gems.gov.za>.
52 Wales, for instance, has established a scheme for recovery for injuries of up to 25,000
pounds and created an administrative body to review claims. However, the requirement of
a finding of negligence on the part of the health care provider places it outside the scope
of this no-fault classification. See Lyons Davidson Solicitors, News Release, “NHS Redress
Scheme for Welsh Clinical Negligence Claims: One Year On” (30 March 2012), online: Lyons Davidson News and Insight <www.lyonsdavidson.co.uk>.
53 Stephen Todd, “Treatment Injury in New Zealand” (2011) 86:3 Chicago-Kent L Rev 1169 at
1173, 1179, 1183.
54 Clarke T Edwards, “The Impact of a No-Fault Tort Reform on Physician Decision-Making:
A Look at Virginia’s Birth Injury Program” (2011) 80:1 Revista Jurídica UPR 285 at 295.
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approximately 60 to 80 percent of claims are facilitated through a health
care provider and in Denmark, the physician files approximately 15 percent of all claims or, in most cases, assists the patient.55 There is an obligation on the part of health care professionals to advise an injured patient of
the possibility of compensation, and each hospital has one or more patient
counsellors to advise patients of their rights and to assist with the process.
By contrast, in France the patient completes the application, and there is
no obligation on the part of the physician to assist.56
Legal services are commonly used in Virginia,57 but are generally considered unnecessary in the Nordic countries. For instance, in Denmark,
lawyers participate in filing about 10 percent of the claims.58 The initial
claims assessment is conducted by one or more assessors following review
by one to three independent medical experts.59 Florida is unique in having
an administrative law judge assess the claim at first instance.60 Each program has an internal appeal process and, if unsuccessful, recourse to the
judicial system on further appeal.61
B. Threshold Criteria to Qualify for Compensation
Denmark’s threshold criteria are typical of the Nordic-based model, which
replaces the negligence standard with a series of broader tests. The first
basis on which a claimant qualifies for compensation under the Danish
no-fault regime is the avoidability rule. If the injury could have been avoided under optimal circumstances, the patient qualifies for compensation.
There are two ways one can qualify. First, the patient qualifies if he or she
55 Mello, Kachalia & Studdert, supra note 50 at 5.
56 Janine Barbot, Isabelle Parizot & Myriam Winance, “‘No-Fault’ Compensation for Victims
of Medical Injuries. Ten Years of Implementing the French Model” (2014) 114:2 Health
Policy 236 at 242.
57 UK, The No-Fault Compensation Review Group, No-Fault Compensation Schemes for Medical Injury: A Review (Interim Report) by Anne-Maree Farrell, Sarah Devaney & Amber Dar
(Scotland: Scottish Government Social Research, 2010) at 55, online: <http://www.gov.scot/
Resource/0039/00394407.pdf>.
58 Mello, Kachalia & Studdert, supra note 50 at 5.
59 Allen B Kachalia et al, “Beyond Negligence: Availability and Medical Injury Compensation”
(2008) 66:2 Social Science & Medicine 387 at 389–90; Randall R Bovbjerg, Frank A Sloan
& Peter J Rankin, “Administrative Performance of ‘No-Fault’ Compensation for Medical
Injury” (1997) 60:2 Law & Contemp Probs 71 at 82–83.
60 The Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Association, “Eligibility &
Benefits”, online: <www.nica.com> [Neurological Injury Compensation Association].
61 Mello, Kachalia & Studdert, supra note 50 at 6; Bovbjerg, Sloan & Rankin, supra note 59 at
83–84.
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can establish that the injury could have been avoided if the health care
provider had used another treatment method that would have been equally effective. The other treatment method must have been available at the
time of treatment, but the treatment need not have been known as equally
effective — in other words, information that becomes available after the
time of treatment may be used in determining its relative effectiveness.62
Second, and in the alternative, the patient receives compensation if
he or she can establish that the best health care provider in the particular
field would have acted differently; the assumption is that the injury would
thereby have been avoided.63 This is the standard of the “experienced
specialist,” which may be contrasted to that of the “reasonable physician”
under Canadian law.64 Recovery is possible due to an injury caused by an
incorrect or delayed diagnosis if the experienced specialist would on a
balance of probabilities have acted differently. If resources or facilities are
not available, there is no recovery unless the experienced specialist would
have referred the patient elsewhere, and that referral would on a balance
of probabilities have prevented the injury.65
A third basis for recovery arises in a circumstance in which the treatment injury was unavoidable, but the extent of injury incurred exceeds
that which the reasonable patient should endure. Both the relative seriousness of the injury and its likelihood of occurrence (i.e., it occurs in less
than two percent of cases) are relevant to the assessment of endurability.66
The patient also receives damages for injury caused by the malfunction
of equipment used for examination or treatment; the reason for the malfunction is not of relevance.67 Thus, the standard is that of strict liability.
Threshold criteria are similar throughout the Nordic countries, with
the following exceptions. In Sweden, the endurability rule (i.e., the criterion that applies where the extent of injury incurred exceeds that which
the reasonable patient should endure) applies only to infections, instead
of to injury broadly as in Denmark.68 The Swedish legislation explicitly
states that, for injuries sustained through accident, recovery is not lim62 Vibe Ulfbeck, Mette Hartlev & Mårten Schultz, “Malpractice in Scandinavia” (2012) 87:1
Chicago-Kent L Rev 111 at 119–20.
63 Jocelyn Downie et al, Patient Safety Law: From Silos to Systems (Canada: Health Canada,
2006) at Appendix 2: Country Reports, Denmark at 15.
64 Ulfbeck, Hartlev & Schultz, supra note 62 at 117, n 24; Flood & Thomas, supra note 15 at 1071.
65 Ulfbeck, Hartlev & Schultz, supra note 62 at 117–18.
66 M Erichsen, “The Danish Patient Insurance System” (2001) 20 Med & L 355 at 364–65.
67 Ulfbeck, Hartlev & Schultz, supra note 62 at 118–19.
68 Ibid at 120.
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ited to those who would be compensated under tort rules.69 Norway does
not have the experienced specialist standard; rather, there is strict liability
for treatment injuries.70 The Norwegian legislation also states that if the
cause of injury is unknown, but was likely an external influence during
treatment, it is to be presumed that a failure in supply of the health care
service was the cause.71
New Zealand adopted a comprehensive no-fault accidental injury
compensation scheme in 1974. Its scope is unique internationally in that
it covers not only medical injury but accidental injury, however incurred,
including workplace and automobile accident injuries. Applicability of the
program to medical malpractice has varied over the years. Initially, the program covered “personal injury by accident,” which de facto included medical malpractice.72 By 1992, economic concerns led to a change such that
to be compensable, the injury had to constitute either “medical error” — 
defined as failure to observe a reasonable standard of care and skill — or
“medical mishap” — defined as an adverse consequence of treatment that
is rare (occurs in less than one percent of cases) and severe (disability or
prolonged hospitalization).73 The scheme became primarily fault-based in
its requirement of a breach in the standard of care and causation of injury.74
The revised scheme resulted in a substantial increase in utilization of
legal services by physicians, a greater use of the common law by plaintiffs,
and systemic delays in the functioning of the administrative scheme.75 The
introduction of a fault-based aspect pitted the interests of health care providers against injured patients in adversarial fashion. A review of the medical malpractice aspect of the scheme led to further reform and expansion
in 2005. The 1992 categories were removed and replaced by the singular
requirement of a personal injury that resulted from a “treatment injury.”76
Excluded are injuries that are an ordinary consequence of treatment, solely
69
70
71
72
73
74
75

Ibid at 121; Finland has an equivalent rule.
Ibid at 117, n 24.
Ibid at 126.
Todd, supra note 52 at 1179.
Ibid at 1187.
Ibid at 1199.
Joanna Manning, “New Zealand’s Remedial Response to Adverse Events in Healthcare”
(2008) 16:2 Torts LJ 120 at 142 [Manning, “Remedial Response”].
76 Todd, supra note 52 at 1179. Joanna Manning is concerned that aspects of negligence law are
creeping in to judicial review of the New Zealand treatment injury criterion: Joanna M Manning, “Plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose: Negligence and Treatment Injury in New
Zealand’s Accident Compensation Scheme” (2014) 14:1–2 Medical Law Intl 22.
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attributable to resource allocation, or caused by a person delaying consent
to treatment.
All remaining no-fault programs other than the Nordic and New Zealand programs are non-comprehensive in scope, being limited to a particular type or severity of injury. Those based on type of injury focus on
obstetrical injury. France’s program focuses on severe injury.
Three jurisdictions — Virginia, Florida, and most recently Japan — have
adopted no-fault programs in response to birth-related injury. Obstetrical
injuries are arguably the most expensive medical liability injury type due
to their potential severity, combined with the likelihood that the injury
will likely endure for the life of the child. To qualify in Virginia, the infant must have incurred an injury to the brain or spinal cord during live
birth due to mechanical injury or oxygen deprivation which causes cognitive disability requiring permanent assistance.77 This narrow category
has ensured the number of claims are kept low (i.e., an average of ten per
year).78 Florida’s plan is similar. The birth must have occurred in a hospital. Injury sustained during resuscitation immediately following delivery
is included.79 To qualify for the Japanese scheme, an infant must usually
be born after 33 weeks of pregnancy, weigh more than 2,000 grams at birth,
be diagnosed with cerebral palsy (impaired muscle coordination and/or
other disability typically caused by brain damage before or at birth) of
high severity, and must not die within the first six months.80
France’s program is aimed at compensation for severe injury. The
first category of patients eligible for the program consists of patients
who experience a “medical hazard”81 directly attributable to prevention,
diagnosis, or treatment.82 This has also been described as a serious and
unpredictable injury “without relation to their previous state of health
77
78
79
80

Edwards, supra note 54 at 294.
Ibid at 295.
Neurological Injury Compensation Association, supra note 60.
Robert B Leflar, “The Law of Medical Misadventure in Japan” (2012) 87:1 Chicago-Kent L
Rev 79 at 107, n 135 [Leflar, “Medical Misadventure”].
81 Also translated to ‘medical accident’. See Dominique Thouvenin, “French Medical Malpractice Compensation Since the Act of March 4, 2002: Liability Rules Combined with Indemnification Rules and Correlated with Several Kinds of Proceedings” (2011) 4:1 Drexel L
Rev 165 at 184.
82 Geneviève Helleringer, “Medical Malpractice and Compensation in France, Part II: Compensation Based on National Solidarity” (2011) 86:3 Chicago-Kent L Rev 1125 at 1126. Note
that in 2010 Belgium enacted legislation providing no-fault coverage for persons within
this first category, also covering victims in situations in which liability insurance coverage
is non-existent or inadequate: Nicole Atwill, “Belgium: New Law on Compensation of Vic-
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and its foreseeable evolution.”83 Next, the injury must be abnormal in relation to the patient’s health status. The hazard must have caused a serious
harm, measured in terms of magnitude of loss of capacity. The disability
rate must exceed 25 percent for a minimum of six months over a 12-month
period.84 One also qualifies if rendered permanently unable to perform
one’s previous occupation. The second category consists of those who
experience a hospital-acquired infection that results in disability greater than 25 percent. Third, is compensation for those who acquire HIV or
Hepatitis C infection through blood transfusion. A rebuttable presumption of causality exists between the transfusion or injection and the infection.85 These categories have been expanded in recent years to include
care provided by professionals outside their area of specialization, harms
from growth hormone, and victims of nuclear testing.86
As has been demonstrated, the criteria for qualification differ from one
no-fault regime to another. However, in each case, provided that the injury
is of the right type and/or magnitude to fit within the program, the circumstance for receipt of compensation is more broad than in a fault-based
medical malpractice legal system.
C. Option to Sue in Negligence
A significant difference between programs is whether or not recovery in
negligence is still available. Sweden leaves open the option for a patient
to sue for medical malpractice, whereas in Denmark such a lawsuit is not
permitted except in case of product liability.87 In Sweden the tort system
is seldom used for medical malpractice, being relied on primarily for injuries not covered by the no-fault scheme;88 99.9 percent of claims are
resolved without recourse to court despite injured patients having the
option to sue in tort.89 The New Zealand scheme is exclusive in that one

83
84
85
86
87
88
89

tims of No-Fault Medical Accidents” The Library of Congress (4 May 2010), online: <www.
loc.gov>.
Barbot, Parizot & Winance, supra note 56 at 238.
Helleringer, supra note 82 at 1127.
Ibid at 1129–30.
Ibid at 1130–31.
Ulfbeck, Hartlev & Schultz, supra note 62 at 116–17.
Ibid at 116.
Kaj Essinger, “The Swedish Medical Injury Insurance” LÖF (20 February 2009) at 5,
online: <www.vm.gov.lv/images/userfiles/phoebe/ministrija_sabiedribas_lidzdaliba_
ab75e1a6c38b637dc22573d800293aaa/zviedrijas_traumu_apdrosin.pdf>.
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is not entitled to sue in tort for any injuries covered by the scheme — lawsuits are permitted primarily in cases of mental harm unaccompanied by
physical injury or if one is claiming for exemplary damages.90 In Japan,
negligence lawsuits are permitted.91 Florida’s program is optional, but a
tort lawsuit is prohibited once a child is accepted into the plan.92
The French program is unique in that it retains tort liability as the primary source of compensation, and indeed a patient who fits within the
category of having experienced a medical hazard is only eligible if negligence cannot be established.93 This leads to the arguably perverse need
for a fault-based analysis as a prerequisite to qualifying for the no-fault
program.
D. Damages
The Nordic systems assess damages in accordance with general tort principles, except that punitive damages are not available, and awards for
non-economic loss are capped. There is an ultimate compensation limit
of US$1.2 million in Sweden94 and US$1.7 million in Denmark.95 New Zealand assesses damages based on statutory criteria, with a focus on rehabilitation; weekly compensation payments are available in cases of ongoing
incapacity to work 30 hours per week.96 Non-economic loss compensation is capped at US$85,000.97 Japan has a maximum payment per child
of US$375,000,98 whereas in France the no-fault scheme has no cap on
indemnification.99

90 Gilmour, supra note 46 at 188.
91 Naoko Akimoto, “Towards a No-Fault Compensation System for Medical Accidents in Japan”
in McDonnell Academy Scholars, Global Leadership Visions (St. Louis: Washington University
in St. Louis, 2013), online: <mcdonnell-pubs.wustl.edu/Oped2011-13/2F497C74A42AB95A6E
CACC9FE7231DCD/GLV%20cropped%202011-2013.pdf>.
92 Neurological Injury Compensation Association, supra note 60.
93 Thouvenin, supra note 81 at 174–75.
94 Mello, Kachalia & Studdert, supra note 50 at 12.
95 Ibid at 7.
96 Farrell, Devaney & Dar, supra note 57 at 26.
97 Mello, Kachalia & Studdert, supra note 50 at 12.
98 Akimoto, supra note 91 at 21.
99 Simon Taylor, Medical Accident Liability and Redress in English and French Law (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2015) at 53–54.
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E. Program Funding
Funding for the no-fault programs comes from a range of sources. The
French program is state-operated and is funded through a combination
of social security contributions from employers and employees, general
income-based contributions, and state-imposed taxes.100 In New Zealand,
funding for the accident compensation scheme includes levies on employers, the self-employed, and government. Levies were originally calculated
on a pay-as-you-go basis, but the program is moving toward a fully-funded
accounting system, including future costs of the claim.101 The government
is empowered by statute to impose levies on registered health professionals and organizations that provide medical treatment; however, this
power has not been utilized.102 Patient liability insurance is mandatory in
Sweden,103 and is maintained by county council districts in both Sweden104
and Denmark.105 Private insurance companies cover doctors without a
contract with the district, a range of other healthcare practitioners, and
nursing homes.106
In Virginia, participating physicians and hospitals pay a set premium
and are eligible for lower insurance premiums for medical malpractice.
Non-participating physicians must also contribute toward the program,
which is required to operate on an actuarially-sound basis.107 The Florida
program is funded similarly to Virginia’s, except that the state of Florida
also granted $40 million at the commencement of the program.108 Japan’s
program is financed by a levy on each pregnant woman at participating
facilities, and the money is then passed on to private insurance companies. The levy is returned to the pregnant woman through her government-sponsored health insurance plan.109 Ultimately, then, the program is
funded through the social insurance system, with private insurance companies covering the liability and standing to incur profit or loss from its
operation.
100 Barbot, Parizot & Winance, supra note 56 at 241.
101 Todd, supra note 52 at 1184.
102 Ibid at 1185.
103 Essinger, supra note 90 at 1.
104 Ulfbeck, Hartlev & Schultz, supra note 63 at 114–15.
105 Downie et al, supra note 64 at Appendix 2: Country Reports, Denmark at 15.
106 Essinger, supra note 89 at 2.
107 Farrell, Devaney & Dar, supra note 57 at 54.
108 Ibid at 58.
109 Leflar, “Medical Misadventure”, supra note 80 at 107, n 137.
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IV. COMPARISON BETWEEN CANADA’S FAULT-BASED APPROACH
AND NO-FAULT 110
In the last section I outlined details of the various no-fault schemes. This
section examines their performance as compared to Canada’s fault-based
approach to compensation for medical malpractice. The criteria to be applied are the extent to which the contrasting approaches may be seen to
meet the goals of compensation, deterrence, corrective justice, and distributive justice.
A. Compensation
It is widely recognized that no-fault schemes are superior at providing
compensation as compared to fault-based approaches. There are two main
reasons for this: the broader range of persons who receive compensation,
and the significantly lower costs of administration.
The number of claims is significantly higher in each of the jurisdictions with a comprehensive no-fault scheme as compared to prior to the
scheme’s introduction. As well, most of the Nordic countries have seen
increases year-over-year in the number of claims and the amount of compensation awarded.111 Mello, Kachalia, and Studdert examined the Swedish
and Danish systems and found that about ten percent of injured patients
enter a claim as compared to two to three percent in the U.S.112 The number of people receiving compensation is also significantly higher. The success rate of applicants receiving compensation varies depending on the
country, from approximately 30 percent in Finland, 32 percent in Norway,
and 35 percent in Denmark, to 44 percent in Sweden.113 In New Zealand,
110 Note that extrapolation from jurisdictions outside Canada should be done with caution, as
the performance of their systems is in part dependent on government-funded health care
and social services networks in place. For example, Sweden’s social welfare system covers
80 percent of the first year of lost wages following injury, as well as significant services
for a disabled infant, so it is not necessary that the no-fault scheme incur these expenses:
Essinger, supra note 89 at 4. The operation of a jurisdiction’s legal system may also be of
relevance. As one example, “until 2013 the UK provided legal aid for qualifying applicants
to bring a medical malpractice claim, significantly driving up the number of tort-based
claims”: Barcan+Kirby, “The impact of legal aid changes on victims of medical negligence”
(6 February 2013), Barcan+Kirby (blog), online : <barcankirby.co.uk>. Also, differing standards for fault-based liability between different jurisdictions influence outcomes.
111 Ulfbeck, Hartley & Schultz, supra note 62 at 128. For recent Finnish figures see Finnish Patient Insurance Centre, “Statistics of Patient Injuries” (2014), online: <www.pvk.fi>.
112 Mello, Kachalia & Studdert, supra note 50 at 5.
113 Ulfbeck, Hartlev & Schultz, supra note 62 at 127–28.
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following the 2005 reforms, the number of claims increased in each year
up to 2009–10, at which time there was a slight drop.114 The overall acceptance rate increased from 40 to 66 percent. From the inception of the
French system in 2002 to 2009, the number of claims gradually increased
year-to-year.115 34 percent of claims were successful.116
By comparison, in Canada, approximately 41.5 percent of CMPA expenditures in 2014 were allocated to legal and expert costs and administration.117 In the U.S., approximately 55 to 60 percent of total system costs
are attributable to overhead.118 Thus, in tort-based jurisdictions, aggrieved
patients are deprived of a very high portion of the total expenditures.
The size of awards tends to be suppressed in no-fault jurisdictions. In
2009, the average compensation award in Sweden was approximately
US$20,000, in Denmark was US$40,000, and in New Zealand was a very
low US$4,450.119 A successful claim in Japan on behalf of a severely injured
child results in a lump sum payment of US$75,000 plus US$300,000 paid
over a 20-year period.120 These rates compare to median damages of $215,700
in Canada in 2014,121 and approximately US$324,000 per award in the U.S.122
There are significant administrative cost savings in jurisdictions with
no-fault schemes as compared to fault-based jurisdictions. Overhead costs
in Denmark and Sweden constitute approximately 17 percent of total system costs.123 In New Zealand, administrative costs are remarkably low: for
2013–14 the claims handling costs amounted to 12.7 percent of total claims
paid.124 Administrative costs associated with medical malpractice have de114
115
116
117

Todd, supra note 52 at 1200–01.
Barbot, Parizot & Winance, supra note 56 at 241.
Ibid at 242.
CMPA, “2014 Annual Report”, supra note 8 at 21–22 (note that this figure does not include
judicial system costs). For 2014, the CMPA’s stated expenses for “Awards, settlements, legal, and experts” totalled $405 million. Of that $405 million, payments to patients through
awards and settlements accounted for $237 million. That leaves $168 million for “legal and
experts,” which amounts to approximately 41.5% of the $405 million total expenditures.
118 Mello, Kachalia & Studdert, supra note 50 at 7.
119 Ibid.
120 Robert B Leflar, “Public and Private Justice: Redressing Health Care Harm in Japan” (2011)
4 Drexel L Rev 243 at 262 [Leflar, “Public and Private Justice”].
121 CMPA, “2014 Annual Report”, supra note 8 at 30.
122 Mello, Kachalia & Studdert, supra note 50 at 7.
123 Ibid.
124 Accident Compensation Corporation, Annual Report 2014 (New Zealand: 2014) at 44, online: <www.acc.co.nz/PRD_EXT_CSMP/groups/external_communications/documents/
reports_results/annual_report_2014.pdf>.
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clined in Virginia, and the administrative costs for the birth-related injury
program are very low relative to the compensation awarded.125
Ulfbeck, Hartley, and Schultz conclude that the Nordic systems are
working well, and contrast this to what they describe as “the perceived
absurdities in other jurisdictions,” referring in particular to the American
medical malpractice tort system.126 They confirm that the aim of providing patients with easier access to compensation has definitely been accomplished.127 There is general consensus that the New Zealand scheme
performs well at providing compensation; while awards are not as high as
some would wish, the fact that so many more people receive compensation
as compared to in a tort-based system is considered to more than make up
for the relatively low size of awards.128
Kirsten Armstrong and Daniel Tess of PricewaterhouseCoopers prepared
a report for a 2008 conference of the Institute of Actuaries of Australia.129
They compared a range of jurisdictions internationally as to whether compensation for injury was based on tort liability, no-fault, or a composite
of the two. Note that while medical injury was one component, the study
was more broadly based in that it also included workplace injury and automobile accidents. They identified the superior performance of no-fault
systems in terms of compensation, in that a significantly higher proportion of claimants are covered and administrative costs are significantly
lower. As to total expenditures in fault-based versus no-fault jurisdictions,
they found as follows:
There is no clear evidence that fault, no fault or blended schemes are,
overall, more expensive than the other scheme types in aggregate, but we
note that more people are compensated under no fault schemes, hence
the per claimant cost is overall cheaper under no fault schemes.130

125
126
127
128

Edwards, supra note 54 at 295.
Ulfbeck, Hartley & Schultz, supra note 62 at 115, 129.
Ibid at 129.
Kirsten Armstrong, Daniel Tess & PricewaterhouseCoopers, Fault Versus No Fault — Reviewing the International Evidence (Australia: Institute of Actuaries of Australia, 2008) at
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B. Deterrence
A major stated aim of tort law is the deterrence of negligent activity. The
idea is that both the defendant and others will avoid repeating their negligent behaviour in the future if a legal action is concluded in favour of the
plaintiff. There is concern that, in a jurisdiction in which there is no need
to attribute fault to the healthcare provider, the deterrent effect of an adverse judgment will be lost. This in turn is believed by some to cause an
increase in the incidence of iatrogenic injury.131
The evidence as to the operative effect of deterrence in medical malpractice liability is weak. A Canadian study by Dewees and Trebilcock
found that physicians tend to change their practice methods in terms
of ordering diagnostic tests and enhancing communications and record-keeping due to threat of medical malpractice liability.132 However, it
is not clear that these measures actually result in better care or reduce injury rates. They concluded that “[t]he evidence concerning the impact of
practice changes on the ultimate medical injury rate is quite fragmentary
and inconclusive.”133
Similarly, Mello and Brennan undertook a review of existing studies on
deterrence in medical malpractice liability in the American context, and
concluded that the evidence of its effect is weak.134 They attribute this to
a range of factors, including the presence of insurance, the premiums of
which are not experience-rated;135 a poor fit between those inclined to commence lawsuits and those who have actually been injured due to medical
malpractice;136 and externalization of the costs of medical malpractice.137
Anne-Maree Farrell cites data from 2001 indicating that the rate of
preventable adverse events is similar as between New Zealand and the
tort-based liability systems in Australia and the U.S.138 This suggests that
131 See generally Manning, “Remedial Response”, supra note 75.
132 Don Dewees & Michael J Trebilcock, “The Efficacy of the Tort System and Its Alternatives:
A Review of Empirical Evidence” (1992) 30:1 Osgoode Hall LJ 57 at 80.
133 Ibid at 82.
134 Michelle M Mello & Troyen A Brennan, “Deterrence of Medical Errors: Theory and Evidence of Malpractice Reform” (2002) 80:7 Texas L Rev 1595 at 1615.
135 Ibid at 1616.
136 Ibid at 1618.
137 Ibid at 1620.
138 Anne-Maree Farrell, “No-Fault Compensation for Medical Injury: Principles, Practice and
Prospects for Reform” in Pamela R Ferguson & Graeme T Laurie, eds, Inspiring a Medico-Legal Revolution: Essays in Honour of Sheila McLean (Farnham, UK: Ashgate Publishing,
2015) 155 at 169.
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deterrence may not be reduced in a no-fault system. After a review of information from a range of countries, Stephen Todd concludes that the evidence about loss of a deterrent factor in no-fault is equivocal at best, and
that this is not sufficient ground for not having a no-fault system given its
other positive characteristics.139
In the Canadian context, the CMPA covers all awards and settlements
in negligence, no matter how high the amount. This results in physicians
not being out-of-pocket when there is a finding of negligence or settlement in favour of the plaintiff, which diminishes any potential deterrent
effect. Further, premiums are not experience-rated, so the potential for
individual deterrence due to financial disincentives is greatly reduced.
Joanna Manning discusses the position of the patient safety movement,
which is that fault-based medical malpractice liability is actually counterproductive to deterrence. It suppresses the open acknowledgement of
error. From a systems perspective, “[a] just culture encouraging open disclosure of error and learning from mistakes by health professionals, rather
than one of blame and secrecy, is necessary to do this. . . . Some highly influential voices consider that the deadlock can only be broken by complete
abolition of tort and replacement with some kind of no-fault model.”140
C. Corrective Justice
Aristotle postulated that an unjust gain for the defendant should be rectified by compensating for the loss of the plaintiff. Thus, in corrective justice terms, the relationship between the parties is the source of the need
for recompense of one to the other — referred to by Ernest Weinrib as the
correlativity as between the “doer and sufferer of the same injustice.”141
There are a range of aims of tort law sometimes categorized as falling under the heading of corrective justice: retribution, atonement, and
appeasement. Compensation focuses on the plaintiff and deterrence on
the tortfeasor and others similarly situated, whereas matters such as
atonement concern both parties to the tortious interaction — the act of
wrongdoing by one party creates the need for atonement by the other, and
atonement should only be granted in law if there has indeed been wrongdoing in the transaction as between the parties.
139 Todd, supra note 52 at 1214.
140 Manning, “Remedial Response”, supra note 75 at 136–37.
141 Ernest J Weinrib, “Civil Recourse and Corrective Justice” (2011) 39:1 Fla St UL Rev 273 at
273 [Weinrib, “Civil Recourse”].

Is It Time to Adopt a No-Fault Scheme to Compensate Injured Patients

Does a fault-based system perform better at meeting the demands
of corrective justice than a no-fault system for addressing medical malpractice? Plaintiffs don’t get to appear before a judge under most no-fault
schemes, and are therefore deprived of the ability for a “reckoning” by the
defendant. However, the statistics previously outlined reveal that only a
tiny portion of those injured due to medical error ever get to enter a claim
in Canada, let alone a court hearing, so the aims of corrective justice in
this regard are seldom met. But to the extent that plaintiffs are deprived
at least in theory, it is necessary that alternative systems be developed in
conjunction with the creation of a no-fault system.
A no-fault scheme must be accompanied by robust patient-complaint
and error-reporting systems. The Nordic countries have extensive error-
reporting systems; the information therein is shielded from use in the
discipline system.142 The systems are used to identify common errors,
which ideally leads to system improvements and enhanced patient safety.
New Zealand has in place a national medication error-reporting system.143
It also created, in 1996, the position of national Health and Disability
Commissioner, who is to investigate complaints of adverse events in public hospitals.144
Mello, Kachalia, and Studdert examined the Swedish and Danish systems and concluded that while there has been controversy over the appropriate standard for compensation, and questions about the adequacy
of awards, “there has been no discussion of returning to a fault-based system of tort liability for medical injuries.”145 They indicate that there is not
adequate evidence as to whether patient safety is enhanced, but that the
strong independent systems of complaints investigation and discipline
have enhanced transparency and safety improvement, and allayed concerns about lack of deterrence in a no-fault system.
D. Distributive Justice
Distributive justice concerns the equitable allocation of goods and resources
among members of society. There is disagreement as to whether distributive
142 Farrell, Devaney & Dar, supra note 57 at 38.
143 Health Quality & Safety Commission New Zealand, Our Programmes, online: <www.hqsc.
govt.nz>.
144 Marie M Bismark et al, “Claiming Behaviour in a No-Fault System of Medical Injury: A Descriptive Analysis of Claimants and Non-Claimants” (2006) 185:4 Medical J Austl 203.
145 Mello, Kachalia & Studdert, supra note 50 at 8.
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justice is an appropriate aim of tort law, with arguments on both sides.146
Corrective justice enthusiast Ernest Weinrib views it as inappropriate to
apply a distributive justice lens to tort law because it is categorically different from corrective justice, which is singly focussed on the interaction
between two individuals. And he sees the relationship as core to the finding of liability.147 However, Peter Cane has responded that tort law combines corrective and distributive justice elements.148 The judicial system
shapes the rules that determine the distribution of the burdens and benefits of liability among a society’s members, which is a decidedly distributive justice function. Dewees and Trebilcock took this concept further by
applying the normative goal of distributive justice, along with deterrence
and corrective justice, to their examination of the tort system and compensatory alternatives to tort. They included as one of their areas of focus
the possible range of responses to medical malpractice.149
Distributive justice is particularly salient when comparing fault and
no-fault compensation for medical injury. It demands that we step back
from the immediate transaction between health care provider and patient
to focus on how society is optimally served. Thus, the weighing of health
outcomes, views of participants, health expenditures overall, and system
efficiencies rise to the fore in examining the performance of fault-based
and no-fault programs.
1. Health Outcomes
In Canada, the median time from commencement of a medical malpractice
action to resolution was 38 months in 2013.150 Similarly, in the U.S., the time
frame for a malpractice claim is three years.151 By comparison, the average
time from filing a claim to initial decision is seven months in Denmark and
eight months in Sweden.152 In New Zealand, the median time for assessment
is a mere 37 days.153 French claims take on average 7.5 months between sub-

146 Weinrib, “Civil Recourse”, supra note 142; Peter Cane, “Distributive Justice and Tort Law”
(2001) 1:4 NZLR 401.
147 Ernest J Weinrib, “Corrective Justice in a Nutshell” (2002) 52:4 UTLJ 349.
148 Cane, supra note 146.
149 Dewees & Trebilcock, supra note 132 at 59–61, 79.
150 Canadian Medical Protective Association, “2013 Annual Report” (2013) at 6 [publication
on file with author].
151 Mello, Kachalia & Studdert, supra note 50 at 6.
152 Ibid.
153 Todd, supra note 52 at 1201.
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mission of the claim and decision.154 The difference in time frames makes a
difference in terms of health and recovery. The Australian actuaries’ study
comparing fault to no-fault regimes around the world found that claimants
have better health outcomes in no-fault systems.155 There are a number of
reasons given: receipt of compensation is dramatically more rapid, resulting
in faster access to treatment; periodic benefits are superior to lump-sum
payments; and administrative schemes can focus on rehabilitation and returning the injured person to work.156 In addition, there are disincentives to
recovery in a tort system, in that damages are assessed as of the date of trial,
which can be many years after injury was incurred.
2. Views of Participants
The views of various constituents of society are significant in examining
distributive justice goals. It has been demonstrated that there is a high
degree of dissatisfaction with Canada’s fault-based medical malpractice
system. The level of satisfaction with no-fault programs can be assessed
from a range of perspectives. Physicians are uniformly positive in the nofault jurisdictions for which evidence is available. In a survey conducted
in New Zealand, 88.5 percent of physician respondents disagreed with the
statement “medical complaints should be resolved in a court of law.”157 In
Denmark, the national physician governing body championed the move
to no-fault. They were motivated primarily to improve the legal recourse
available to patients injured through the receipt of health care services.
They found it unreasonable that they were in a perceived conflict of interest in terms of their ability to help injured patients, and sought to be able
to assist them in establishing their claims. They also disliked the expenditure of time and energy to sort through liability as between a physician
and health facility.158
All birth-related neurological injury schemes are voluntary for physicians. It is significant to note that over 90 percent of eligible physicians
have opted in to the Virginia and Florida programs.159 In Japan, almost all
154
155
156
157

Barbot, Parizot & Winance, supra note 56 at 242–43.
Armstrong, Tess & PricewaterhouseCoopers, supra note 128 at 34.
Ibid.
Wayne Cunningham, “New Zealand Doctors’ Attitudes Towards the Complaints and Disciplinary Process” (2004) 117:1198 NZ Medical J 1 at 5.
158 Downie et al, supra note 63 at Appendix 2: Country Reports, Denmark at 13.
159 James M Jeffords, “No-Fault Compensation for Medical Malpractice”, The University of
Vermont (9 March 2010) at 4, online: <http://www.uvm.edu/~vlrs/Health/No%20Fault%20
Medical.pdf>.
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childbirth facilities have opted in to the no-fault program (99.7 percent).160
The Japan Medical Association is supportive of extending the obstetrical injury no-fault program to medical malpractice more broadly,161 and a
commission has been appointed to consider the appropriateness of such
a development.162
It is perhaps not surprising that physicians are supportive of no-fault,
especially in the jurisdictions in which a tort action is no longer permitted. Physicians experience anxiety, guilt, and shame when sued,163 so relief
from having to anticipate a lawsuit is a significant bonus. Further, with the
fear of liability removed, physicians are keen to support patients in their
attempts to obtain compensation for injury.
The legal community tends not to be supportive of no-fault, due to its
diminished role. Scotland has been considering whether to adopt a nofault scheme. When polled, the Forum of Insurance Lawyers responded
in opposition,164 and the Scottish Association of Personal Injury Lawyers
expressed a range of concerns.165
However, some lawyers are supportive of no-fault. The Japan Federation of Bar Associations is supportive of a move to broader no-fault beyond the present birth-related neurological injury scheme.166 And, writing
from a Scandinavian perspective, academics Ulfbeck, Hartley, and Schultz
wryly comment:
Scandinavian lawyers will generally talk about malpractice law in the U.S.,
or rather the stories about malpractice law in the U.S., with a tone of horror in their voices. One of the most common arguments in favour of the
Nordic model in this area is that it successfully avoids the (supposedly)
perverse effects of malpractice law in the U.S.167

Views of the public and of patients under no-fault schemes provide
valuable insight. In New Zealand, a poll taken in 2013–14 found that public
160
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trust and confidence in the system stood at 54 percent. Turning specifically to those who had utilized the services of the system, 75 percent of
clients surveyed indicated they were satisfied with the service they had
received.168
3. Health Expenditures
It is important to examine overall costs to society in the context of distributive justice. In 2014 Tom Vandersteegen et al. undertook an examination of medical malpractice systems as determinants of health spending
in OECD countries.169 Their overall conclusion was that no-fault schemes
for medical injuries resulted in significantly decreased health expenditures per capita, provided that there was an uncoupling of deterrence and
compensation — i.e., the New Zealand and Nordic schemes remove the requirement that a patient establish fault on the part of the physician. On
the other hand, the French scheme has a moderately higher level of health
care spending. This may be attributable to the fact that, in France, the
patient must establish the absence of a claim in negligence in order to be
eligible for the no-fault scheme. Thus, the attempted attribution of fault
is a preliminary requirement in France. The authors propose that this may
result from the practice of defensive medicine on the part of French physicians because of the increase in potential liability.170
4. System Efficiencies
The fault-based medical malpractice system performs particularly poorly on the criterion of efficiency. As has been demonstrated previously, a
very high portion of costs of the system are expended on legal fees, the
retention of expert witnesses by each of the parties to the dispute, and
costs of access to the judicial system, including accompanying lengthy
delays. These delays in turn exacerbate problems with rehabilitation. Nofault serves to reduce these inefficiencies and place a greater portion of
expenditures in the hands of injured patients.
Distributive justice aspects are problematic in our fault-based system
for a number of reasons. Governments across Canada are covering by far
168 Accident Compensation Corporation, supra note 124 at 10.
169 Tom Vandersteegen et al, “The Impact of No-Fault Compensation on Health Care Expenditures: An Empirical Study of OECD Countries” (2014) 119 Health Policy 367 at 371, online: <www.elsevier.com>.
170 Ibid. The authors caution that one exercise caution in interpreting these findings due to
the recent introduction of the French no-fault regime.
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the greatest share of CMPA defence fees, meaning that substantial fiscal
resources of government are ultimately utilized in defence of physicians
against claims of patients injured due to medical error. Further, the high
cost of bringing a lawsuit for medical malpractice, with the accompanying need for lawyers and expert witnesses, makes doing so prohibitive for
most injured patients, especially those of lower socioeconomic status. A
no-fault system is inherently an acknowledgement of collective responsibility by the state to provide care for those injured due to medical mishap.171 Thus, no-fault is clearly superior in serving distributive justice goals.
V. CONCLUSION
It has been demonstrated that no-fault compensation schemes have advantages on a number of fronts: a serious reduction in administrative
costs, including cost savings to the judicial system; a reduction in the need
for legal services; a major increase in the number of injured patients receiving compensation; a reduction in the time from launching a claim to
receipt of an award; the physician can become an ally to the patient in
seeking compensation; and amounts of awards can be controlled through
regulated caps and charts. There is also scope for significant rehabilitation components, as incorporated into the New Zealand scheme.172 Patient
health outcomes are enhanced as a result of a rehabilitation focus combined with expeditious handling of claims, and the need to prolong injury
in order to enhance the size of the damages award is reduced or removed.
The neutrality of having independent experts in no-fault has considerable
advantages over the tort-based approach, including cost, regional disparities in terms of access to experts to testify, and the non-impartiality of
expert witnesses in medical malpractice.
There are disadvantages as well. Depending on the scheme, and its vulnerability to cost-cutting due to downturns in the economy, award levels
may be seriously depressed. Start-up costs can be substantial, especially
with an anticipated major increase in the number of claims. The removal of the need to establish fault reduces deterrent effects on behaviour.
There are concerns that victims of medical injury are treated more favourably than persons with other illnesses or disabilities.

171 Farrell, supra note 138.
172 Farrell, Devaney & Dar, supra note 57 at 23.
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How does no-fault compare to a fault-based system according to the
normative goals of compensation, deterrence, corrective justice, and distributive justice? First, no-fault schemes are superior at providing compensation. As estimated previously, perhaps 3.35 percent of injured patients with
viable claims in Canada commence legal action, and less than half of those
receive any form of compensation in our tort-based system. The vigorous
defence policies of the CMPA result in a system wherein injured parties are
less likely to receive compensation than they would in a non-medical malpractice tort-based lawsuit. While the average award may be lower under
no-fault, the fact that many more persons are able to receive compensation
(due to the broader scope for recovery combined with lower costs of administration) more than makes up for the reduction in size of award.
Second, when it comes to deterrence, the evidence that deterrence is
operative in a fault-based medical malpractice jurisdiction is weak at best,
and is countered by comparative evidence from New Zealand that the incidence of preventable adverse events is similar to that of Australia and
the U.S., both of which are fault-based. The Canadian system, in which
physicians’ defence is fully covered by the CMPA and premiums are not
experience-based, is particularly weak on deterrence. And it is argued by
the patient safety movement that deterrence is reduced in a fault-based
system due to the accompanying suppression of error acknowledgement
as compared to a system in which error may be openly acknowledged
without the accompanying fear of litigation.
Next, it has been demonstrated that corrective justice may be reduced under no-fault schemes. It is essential that any no-fault program
be accompanied by robust error-reporting systems and patient complaint
mechanisms.
Finally, no-fault programs shine when distributive justice goals are
examined. Health outcomes are enhanced due to the substantially shorter time frames between injury and receipt of compensation. Treatment
availability, rehabilitation, and return to work are all enhanced. Participants in no-fault jurisdictions, including physicians, members of the public, and injured patients, are all supportive of the system. Total health
expenditures are reduced provided there is an uncoupling of deterrence
and compensation, and system efficiencies are uniformly more positive
under no-fault schemes. The substantial provincial government contributions toward CMPA premiums mean that, strangely, physicians are being
subsidized by taxpayers to defend themselves against the claims of injured patients. From a distributive justice perspective, this seems perverse.
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Thus, on balance, no-fault medical malpractice compensation schemes
are superior on a range of criteria. They appear to fall short only when it
comes to corrective justice aims, a failing which may be alleviated with
enhanced patient complaint and error reporting systems.
Robert Prichard recommended in 1990 that an optional no-fault administrative compensation scheme for serious medical injuries should be
created for Canadians.173 This recommendation was never adopted, due in
part to inertia and relative satisfaction with the status quo at the time.174
The recent sharp increase in CMPA fees, the government’s role in subsidizing these fees at the expense of taxpayers, and a greatly enhanced
patient safety agenda may serve as joint catalysts to re-open the discussion. Recent evidence as to the solid performance record of no-fault programs around the world on a range of criteria presents fresh opportunity
for Canadians to consider adopting a no-fault model of compensation for
medical injury.

173 Prichard, supra note 2 at 7.
174 Baker & Norton, supra note 31 at 134.

